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Beyond Copper Exports: What Zambia Would Need to Make More at Home
Zambia already processes and exports copper. The harder question is which additional activities can compete, retain income locally and create durable employment. Evidence points to selective expansion backed by dependable electricity, industrial skills and reachable customers, not a leap from ore to every finished technology.
Beyond Copper Exports: What Zambia Would Need to Make More at Home
Zambia’s copper ambitions contain two different promises: producing more metal and building more industry around it. Achieving the first does not automatically deliver the second. The government’s 2031 production target is 3 million tonnes annually; the national strategy also includes processing, research and development, and supplying goods and services. Those are related objectives, not interchangeable measures of success. International Energy Agency, strategy record updated June 2026.
The distinction matters because a rising export total can conceal a narrow domestic production base. A mine can expand without a local manufacturer winning an order. Conversely, a competitive supplier can create industrial capabilities without making the most technologically sophisticated final product. The useful test is therefore not whether Zambia processes “more” in the abstract, but which additional activity can operate reliably, sell competitively and leave sustainable income in the country.
Zambia is not starting with ore alone
The World Bank’s 2025 Economic Update reports that, by export value in 2023, 78% of Zambia’s copper exports were unrefined, 22% refined and less than 1% copper wire-related articles. Its unrefined category includes ore and concentrate, but should not be mistaken for a claim that all those exports were untouched rock. The report identifies existing capacity to make rods, tubes, bars, wires, cables and connectors. It also records regional buyers: South Africa, Botswana and Tanzania took most copper-wire exports. Economic Update, pages 29–30.
That evidence changes the starting question. Zambia does not need to discover manufacturing from nothing. It needs to establish why existing activities remain small and whether additional production can win orders. The same report describes domestic fabricators operating at roughly 30–50% capacity. Building another factory is not an adequate answer until the constraints on using existing machinery are understood.
These are dated findings, not a November 2026 plant census. They establish a baseline and an investigation priority, not the current output of every manufacturer.
A higher selling price is not the whole gain
The April 2026 study Leveraging Copper for Economic Transformation distinguishes a product’s gross selling value from the value retained through production. A more elaborate copper product can command a higher price while also requiring expensive energy, imported inputs, equipment and financing. Its analysis finds the clearest near-term expansion opportunities in smelting and refining, while treating downstream manufacturing as more conditional. International Institute for Sustainable Development/Intergovernmental Forum study.
This is not an argument against manufacturing. It is an argument against judging projects by a photograph of a finished product or by export revenue alone. A credible appraisal must show the costs incurred to earn that revenue, the employment sustained and the local businesses paid. Otherwise, “value addition” can describe a physical transformation without establishing a worthwhile economic return.
The study’s sequencing argument is consequently important: improve feasible processing while building the conditions for more complex production. It does not establish that every proposed refinery is profitable, or that manufacturing must wait indefinitely. Those conclusions require project-specific evidence.
Cheap electricity and usable electricity differ
The United Kingdom’s October 2025 investment case illustrates the tension. It advertises Zambian power tariffs as low as US$0.04 per kilowatt-hour and a strongly renewable electricity mix, while explicitly identifying hydro-dependent reliability as a constraint. It also lists shortages of skilled labour and processing reagents. UK Growth Gateway investment case.
The tariff is not a universal offer to every manufacturer, nor a verified current quotation. Its significance is the contrast within the investment proposition itself. An attractive unit price does not establish that electricity will arrive when production requires it. Equally, renewable generation is not synonymous with resilience to water shortages. An investor’s cost model needs the contracted service, supply interruptions and any replacement-power arrangements, not simply the lowest published tariff.
Mining’s protection does not prove supplier resilience
The World Bank’s 2026 electricity assessment says hydropower represents over three quarters of installed capacity and that the 2024 drought reduced available power by about one third. It describes mining, responsible for roughly half of national electricity use, as relatively protected through grid priority and backup, while households and smaller businesses bore substantial disruption. World Bank electricity assessment.
That distribution matters for industrial policy. A large mine’s ability to maintain output does not demonstrate that nearby workshops or prospective component makers have equally dependable supply. Their feasibility must be assessed separately.
The Bank’s proposed response combines generation diversification, regional integration and improved utility finances. The industrial implication is practical: evaluate a proposed manufacturing expansion against its actual power arrangements. Counting installed megawatts nationally cannot substitute for testing whether the factory can obtain affordable electricity throughout its operating cycle.
Skills must reach the production floor
The World Bank’s September 2025 workforce assessment identifies shortages in technician and technologist training and weak links between many training institutions and industry. It also describes downstream copper manufacturing as small and capital-intensive. More processing is therefore not a reliable shorthand for mass employment. World Bank workforce assessment.
The relevant capability is broader than a mining engineering degree. Equipment must be operated, maintained and repaired; products must meet buyers’ requirements. A factory proposal that names machinery but cannot identify its training arrangements leaves a central operating question unanswered. Employment projections likewise need a specified process and staffing model. Global ratios of jobs to investment should not be presented as guaranteed Zambian jobs.
Training announcements need outcome tests
There is movement beyond diagnosis. In March 2026, the International Labour Organization reported the launch of Zambia’s critical-skills tools and a pilot intended to place 1,000 apprentices in one-year workplace training across four priority sectors. That is a programme commitment, not evidence that 1,000 people have completed training or entered permanent employment. ILO launch report.
A separate UNIDO-supported heavy-equipment programme at Kitwe supplies a useful example of outcome reporting. Its second-quarter 2026 update records 504 cumulative graduates. A tracer study reached 196 graduates, of whom 54 were employed when assessed, reported as 28%. Those numbers describe that programme and surveyed group, not Zambia’s entire technical workforce or copper manufacturers. UNIDO quarterly results.
The lesson is methodological rather than accusatory. Training provision, successful completion and employment are different results. Manufacturing plans need all three tracked, including whether graduates enter relevant work. A training centre’s existence alone cannot establish that a proposed industrial expansion has the people it requires.
Customers must be reachable
Market access also has a physical component. In February 2024, the World Bank announced a US$270 million grant for the six-year Transport Corridors for Economic Resilience project. Its planned work includes the Serenje–Mpika road section and a one-stop border post at Nakonde, alongside improvements to transport and trade systems on the Dar es Salaam corridor. World Bank project announcement.
These are funded interventions, not proof that all intended improvements have been delivered. For a manufacturer, the relevant result is a dependable route to customers and inputs. A preferential market-access agreement cannot, by itself, move a delayed consignment. Appraisal therefore needs realistic delivery times and logistics costs alongside the product’s factory-gate price.
Test the product, not the slogan
For an individual manufacturing proposal, these findings suggest a concrete sequence of questions. Name the product and its intended customer first. Then specify the required copper input, other components, production process and quality requirements. Establish the delivered input cost and the delivered selling price, rather than comparing metal prices at different processing stages. Finally, test whether the operation remains viable when power, transport or financing costs worsen.
This is an appraisal framework, not a finding that a particular business has failed those tests. It also distinguishes making a product from merely assembling imported components: both may be commercially useful, but their domestic contribution must be measured rather than assumed. The same discipline applies to intermediate goods as to finished equipment.
A compact is a framework, not a factory
The 2026 Zambia Metals and Minerals Country Compact explicitly connects industrial ambitions with energy, transport, skills and access to refined copper. It proposes promoting wire, cables, transformers and electrical panels for regional markets. It also acknowledges environmental-regulator capacity constraints and commits to stronger environmental and social governance. Government of Zambia–World Bank compact, sections 2–4.
That makes the compact a useful accountability framework, but not proof that the named industries are commercially established. Progress must be tested through production, sales, reliable inputs and compliance, not the repetition of announced ambitions.
The evidence supports a selective route beyond copper exports: deepen activities with demonstrated capabilities and reachable customers while resolving their operating constraints. It does not support the assumption that possessing copper makes every copper-using industry competitive. The decisive industrial asset is the system that allows a business to turn metal into a product buyers repeatedly purchase, with benefits that survive after costs are paid.
Sources & editorial status
- International Energy Agency, strategy record updated June 2026 ↗Source
- Economic Update, pages 29–30 ↗Source
- International Institute for Sustainable Development/Intergovernmental Forum study ↗Source
- UK Growth Gateway investment case ↗Source
- World Bank electricity assessment ↗Source
- World Bank workforce assessment ↗Source
- ILO launch report ↗Source
- UNIDO quarterly results ↗Source
- World Bank project announcement ↗Source
- Government of Zambia–World Bank compact, sections 2–4 ↗Source
Source note
By The Kopje Journal & Review. Original editorial research; sources linked in the article.